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When the San Antonio Spurs captured the 2004-2005 National
Basketball Association Championship, one must wonder what went through
the mind of young Argentine guard Manu Ginobili. Most likely, it was not
the income tax consequences of his latest championship season. However,
with an estimated yearly salary of over six million dollars (excluding
income from advertising or sponsorships),' it is likely that the respective
governments of the United States and Argentina were thinking about just
that very issue. The United States has an interest in receiving a fair share of
Ginobili's income because he enjoyed the benefits of performing services
within its borders.2 On the other hand, Ginobili probably should be
concerned about double taxation-both the United States and Argentina
imposing a tax on the same income.3 Any artist or athlete providing
services in multiple countries faces the issue of double taxation.
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Northwestern University School of Law.
Emanuel (Manu) David Ginobili re-signed with the Spurs on July 15, 2004 after an
initial two-year contract. While the terms of deal were not announced, media reports stated
that the six-year contract was believed to be worth $52 million, of which $6,603,500 was
paid for the 2004-2005 season. See Nets' Martin Dealt to Denver; New Jersey Gets 3 First-
Round Picks Bryant Elects to Stay with Lakers, TORONTO STAR, July 16, 2004, at Sports
B08; see also USA Today Salaries Database-Pro Basketball, http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/front.htm (follow "Pro Basketball home" hyperlink; then follow "Salary Database"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
2 Debra Dobray & Tim Kreatschman, Taxation Issues Facing the Foreign Athlete or
Entertainer, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L COMP. & L. 265, 279 (1988).
3 Double taxation is defined as "[t]he imposition of two taxes on the same property
during the same period and for the same taxing purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1500
(8th ed. 2004).
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Traditionally, this issue is solved through the "Artiste and Athlete Article"
of a bilateral tax treaty.4 Yet, currently there is no tax treaty in place
between the United States and any South American country.
On a separate economic front, thirty-five nations met at Mar del Plata,
Argentina to continue discussions about free trade in North and South
America at the Fourth Summit of Americas ("SOA") conference on
November 3-4, 2005.' As the dominant economic power in the
hemisphere, the United States stands to benefit substantially from
developing free trade. The removal of current tariffs and other entry
barriers would significantly expand American exports to the region.
However, at the SOA, President Bush's pursuit of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas ("FTAA") 6 was overshadowed by protests aimed at highlighting
poverty, inequality, and unemployment across South America. The SOA
ended without any agreement or commitment from the representative
nations to meet again for further discussions.
At first glance, it does not appear that taxation issues facing the
international athlete and developing free trade between North and South
America are closely related; they represent very different aspects of cross-
border transactions and investment. On the other hand, they may be related
when viewed as sequential steps in the process toward developing sustained
economic relationships. This article will attempt to bridge that gap. First,
Part II of this article discusses the current United States approach toward
taxation of international athletes. Next, Part III reviews the history and
issues facing tax treaty negotiations between the United States and
developing countries, with a focus on the negotiation sticking points
4 See Stephanie C. Evans, Note, U.S. Taxation of International Athletes: A
Reexamination of the Artiste and Athlete Article in Tax Treaties, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 297, 304 (1995-1996) (discussing use of bilateral tax treaties and arguing for
implementation of a multilateral tax treaty with respect to international athletes). In relieving
double taxation, a tax treaty "allocates the primary taxing right to an item of income to one
country, and obligates the other country to give up its own right of taxation so the taxpayer
does not have to pay tax to both countries on the same income." Daniel Berman, Tax
Treaties-Fundamentals, 591 TAx L. ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 603, 607
(2003).
5 The first SOA was held in 1994, with the ultimate purpose of setting up free trade in the
Americas by 2005. Instead, however, small trade blocs have developed throughout the
Americas, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), the Central
American Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA") (see infra note 80), and the Southern Common
Market ("MERCUSOR"). See T.N.C. Rajagopalan, Summit of Americas: Setback for Free
Trade, BUSINESS STANDARD, Nov. 7, 2005, at 7.
6 The FTAA would be larger than the European Union, but without its free flow of labor
and political integration. Id. In addition, an FTAA would "grant U.S. firms preferential
treatment-as against, for example, competitors from Europe and Asia." Richard E.
Feinberg, Policy Issues, Regionalism and Domestic Politics: U.S.-Latin American Trade
Policy in the Bush Era, 44 LATIN AM. POL. SOC'Y 127, 132 (2002).
7 Rajagopalan, supra note 5.
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between the United States and Brazil. Finally, Part IV of this article argues
that a multilateral tax treaty regarding the singular issue of international
athletes is a viable tool to help strengthen economic relations in the
Americas. Moreover, this initial treaty will open doors to further economic
integration resulting in a positive effect on free trade discussions.
II. REVIEW OF CURRENT UNITED STATES TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ATHLETES
In order to understand why a multilateral tax treaty in the Americas is
feasible, it is important to review the current approach of the United States
toward taxing foreign athletes. This part, therefore, will review the
treatment of international athletes under three different scenarios: (1)
treatment under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") where no tax
treaty has been executed with a foreign athlete's home nation, (2) treatment
under the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty for athlete residents of Canada, and (3)
treatment under the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty for athlete residents of
Mexico.
A. Treatment Under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (No Treaty)
When no tax treaty exists with the home nation of a foreign athlete, the
I.R.C. governs the applicable tax treatment of an athlete performing in the
United States.8
1. Tax Treatment as Resident Alien vs. Nonresident Alien
First, the I.R.C. determines whether the foreign individual is a resident
or nonresident alien for purposes of tax treatment. This assessment is
critical because the applicable tax rate and tax liability differ depending on
this classification.
A resident alien (for purposes of taxation) is classified as such by
meeting one of two tests. First, under the "Green Card Test" (a/k/a
"Permanent Residency Test"), any individual who holds or applies for an
alien registration card (a "green card") during the calendar year attains U.S.
8 It is well settled that the United States has jurisdiction to tax a nonresident who "does
business in the state, but only with respect to income derived from or associated with
presence or doing business within the state . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 412(1)(b) (1987).
9 Under I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A), an alien is a resident alien if the individual: (i) is a lawful
permanent resident of the United States at any time during the calendar year in question, (ii)
meets the substantial presence test, or (iii) has elected to be treated as such. I.R.C. §
7701(b)(1)(A) (2006). If any of these elements are met, the individual is "treated as a
resident alien for federal tax purposes, regardless of the subjective intent concerning the
nature and duration of the alien's stay in the United States." JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J.
PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION-CURRENT THROUGH 2006, B 1.02(2)(c)(i) (2006).
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resident status for purposes of tax jurisdiction. 10 Alternatively, under the
"Substantial Presence Test," a foreign individual is a resident alien if
present in the United States on (1) at least thirty-one days during the
calendar year and (2) a total of 183 days during the current year and the two
preceding calendar years." If the individual does not meet either the Green
Card Test or the Substantial Presence Test (and has not elected tax
treatment as a resident alien), then the individual is considered a
nonresident alien for federal tax purposes. Therefore, it is clear that an
alien may qualify as a U.S. resident for tax purposes while simultaneously
qualifying as a taxable resident of the individual's home nation as well.
This is important because of the U.S. approach to taxing resident aliens.
A resident alien is generally treated in much the same manner as a U.S.
citizen for tax purposes: worldwide income (without regard to where it was
earned) is subject to U.S. income tax with only a few limited exceptions."
On the other hand, a nonresident alien is subject to taxation of income
earned in the United States in one of two ways:' 3 (1) income from U.S.
sources not effectively connected with a trade or business conducted in the
United States, without an allowance for deductions, is taxed at a flat rate of
thirty percent,' 4 and (2) income that is effectively connected with trade or
business conducted in the United States 15 is taxable, after allowable
" I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) states that an alien individual will be considered a permanent
U.S. tax resident if the person is "[1]awfully admitted for permanent residence . . . at any
time during such calendar year." I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006). Lawful permanent
residence occurs if the individual has been lawfully accorded the privilege of permanent
residence under U.S. immigration laws and such status has not been either revoked or
abandoned. KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 9, at B1.02(2)(c)(ii). Possession of a "green
card" is traditional proof that a foreigner was lawfully admitted, and hence the name of the
test. See Bennet Susser, Achieving Parity in the Taxation of Nonresident Alien Entertainers,
5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 613, 620 n.53 (1986).
" See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (2006). When determining the 183-day requirement, "each
day of presence in the United States during the current year counts as a full day, each day in
the first preceding year counts as one third of a day, and each day in the second preceding
year counts as one sixth of a day." KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 9, at B1.02(2)(c)(iii).
12 Relating to individuals, these exceptions allow for (1) a tax credit for foreign taxes
paid as discussed in Part II.A.2, infra, (2) the exclusion of "foreign earned income"
(currently up to $70,000 of such income), such as amounts provided by an employer with
respect to housing, (3) the exclusion of extraterritorial income defined as a taxpayer's gross
income that is attributable to "foreign trading gross receipts," and (4) an alien individual
employed by a foreign government or international organization "to exclude from gross
income any wages, fees, or salary received as compensation for official services to such
government or international organization if certain conditions are met." See generally KUtTz
& PERONI, supra note 9, at B1.03.
13 See KAREN BROWN, 12 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATION § 45.18 (2005), for a
more thorough explanation of nonresident alien taxation under the I.R.C.
14 See I.R.C. § 87 1(a) (2006).
15 The performance of personal services in the United States is considered engaging in a
trade or business. I.R.C. § 864(b) (2006).
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deductions, at the graduated rates applicable to U.S. citizens and resident
aliens.16 Salary, fees, wages, compensation, bonuses, and prize winnings
are considered paid in connection with the athlete's trade or business in the
United States.' A nonresident alien, however, is not subject to U.S.
taxation on compensation earned for services performed or rendered outside
the United States.18
Thus, the "tax distinction" between a resident and nonresident alien is
critical for determining a foreign athlete's potential tax liability as
calculated from the base of (1) worldwide income or (2) only that income
earned while in the United States.
2. The Foreign Tax Credit
Based on the concern that double taxation undermines the theories of
free market economics, modern tax codes have provisions designed to
relieve double taxation.19 This can be done in three ways: (1) tax credit for
foreign taxes paid by the domestic taxpayer (a "foreign tax credit"), (2)
exclusion of foreign source income from the domestic tax base, and/or (3)
income tax deduction for foreign taxes paid by a domestic taxpayer.2" The
I.R.C. employs the use of a foreign tax credit.2
Generally, the I.R.C. foreign tax credit works by "allowing resident
taxpayers to credit their foreign taxes paid against their domestic tax
liability., 22  In other words, it allows a dollar-for-dollar offset against
resident-country income tax liability for respective dollars of foreign
income tax paid.23 A U.S. resident alien may credit the "amount of any
6 See I.R.C. § 871(b)(1) (2006).
17 See id. However, such income is not taxable if the nonresident alien: (1) has gross
income for services performed in the United States that does not exceed $3,000 during the
taxable year, (2) was not present in the United States during the taxable year for more than
90 total days, and (3) performs for a nonresident alien individual, foreign partnership, or
foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the United States or "for an
office or place of business maintained in a foreign country or in a possession of the United
States by an individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States or by a domestic
partnership or domestic corporation." I.R.C. § 864(b)(1) (2006). See also Evans, supra note
4, at 302.
18 See I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(A) (2006).
19 JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN
PERSONS AND FOREIGN INCOME 3 (1996); see also Richard Mitchell, Note, United States-
Brazil Bilateral Income Tax Treaty Negotiations, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 209,
216 (1997-1998).
20 JON E. BISCHEL & ROBERT FEINSCHEIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 4 (1977); see also Mitchell, supra note 19, at 216.
21 See generally I.R.C. §§ 901-908 (2006) (assessing the availability of the foreign tax
credit under current U.S. domestic tax law).
22 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 216.
23 Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World With Disparate Tax Systems,
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such taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country.
' 24
A nonresident alien engaged in trade or business within the United States
during the taxable year shall be allowed a credit "for the amount of any
income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the
taxable year . . . to any foreign country . . .with respect to income
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States. 25
Although the I.R.C. foreign tax credit does aid in alleviating double
taxation, it "suffers from several imperfections.' 26  Most notably, the
decision to utilize a foreign tax credit may encourage foreign tax authorities
to impose rates on U.S. investors that are at least as high as U.S. domestic
rates. The foreign treasury would suffer a revenue loss with no
investment gains if they imposed lower rates.28 Additionally, under the
current system, taxpayers with net losses may pay foreign taxes to a count 79
of source income that cannot be credited against domestic tax liability.
Finally, the "basket" system employed by the I.R.C. functionally allows for
double-taxation of certain income, such as passive income. 30  Under the
"basket" system, U.S. residents claiming a foreign tax credit must separate
all foreign source income into one or more statutory categories, or
"baskets," of income.31 The taxpayer then computes and applies a separate
tax limitation on each "basket.''32 Under the passive income example, any
passive income earned in a foreign country and subjected to a high source
tax would be allocated to the general income "basket. 33  However,
"[i]nstead of being able to credit the full amount of foreign taxes paid on the
highly-taxed passive income by combining it with low- or no-taxed passive
income . . .the highly-taxed passive income is likely to create additional
excess . . . credits in the general income basket" that cannot be fully
utilized.34 Foreign tax credit carryovers expire after five years, and
81 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1769 (1995).
24 I.R.C. § 901(b)(3) (2006).
25 I.R.C. § 906(a) (2006); see also I.R.C. § 901(b)(4) (2006) (discussing the application
and limitations of the credit for alien nonresidents).
26 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 217. For a more detailed discussion of several flaws in the
foreign tax credit with regard to double taxation, see id. at 217-20, or see Roin, supra note
23, at 1772-74.
27 Roin, supra note 23, at 1768.
28 Id. at 1768-69.
29 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 217.
30 See id. at 218. Passive income is income from business activities in which the taxpayer
does not materially participate, such as royalties, rents, annuities, interest, and certain
dividends. KuNTz & PERONI, supra note 9, at B4.16(5)(b)(i).
31 See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1) (2006).
32 See id.
31 See id. § 904(d)(1)(I); see also Roin, supra note 23, at 1773.
34 Roin, supra note 23, at 1773.
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therefore, the U.S. taxpayer may be subject to double taxation on this
passive income in spite of the foreign tax credit.35
B. Treatment Under Tax Treaties
On a broad level, the primary reason for developing a tax treaty is to
avoid tax barriers to cross-border transactions and investment through the
coordination of potentially disparate tax systems.36 To facilitate this goal, a
tax treaty seeks primarily to relieve double taxation by (1) assigning the
primary taxing right to an item of income to one country and (2) requiring
the other country to give up its own right of taxation to that same item of
income. 37 Thus, one of the fundamental purposes of any tax treaty is "to
eliminate double taxation more effectively than unilateral legislation such
as foreign tax credit laws."38
Procedurally, a tax treaty in the United States is negotiated by the
Department of Treasury under authority delegated by the Department of
State. 39 Although the Executive Branch negotiates and develops any treaty,
the ultimate approval of a tax treaty (as with any other treaty) resides with
the Senate.40  When ratified, the tax treaty overrules the I.R.C. 41 and
35 See I.R.C. § 904(c) (2006); see also Mitchell, supra note 19, at 218.
36 Berman, supra note 4, at 607.
" Id. at 608.
38 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 219. Additionally, tax treaties are important for
determining international taxation issues such as "conflicting concepts of taxable income,
conflicting rules on the timing of income and deductions, or conflicting source-of-income
rules between the United States and its treaty partners." BISCHEL & FEINSCHEIBER, supra
note 21, at 204.
39 Berman, supra note 4, at 624. The United States is currently party to approximately
sixty-four tax treaties, excluding estate and gift tax treaties, or treaties of friendship,
commerce, or navigation. See Richard Gordon, John Venuti & Diane Renfroe, Current
Status of U.S. Tax Treaties, 31 TAx MGM'T INT'L J. 266 (2002).
40 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. As Daniel Berman notes, this represents an interesting
role reversal between normal tax legislation and the treaty process:
In legislation, Congress initiates and develops the process while the President
reserves the right to sign or veto the ultimate product. The veto threat is an
interactive one, however, such that the President often can influence the
development of legislation as it works its way through the Congress. These roles
are reversed in the case of Treaties. Treaties are prioritized, negotiated, and signed
by the Executive Branch, with the Senate (and only the Senate) reserving the right
to advise and consent to ratification. Like the President's veto power over
legislation, the Senate's ultimate approval power over treaties can influence the
content of treaties as negotiated by the Executive.
Berman, supra note 4, 632-33.
41 A validly ratified treaty is equivalent in force of national law to a federal statute. Thus,
if the treaty conflicts with another statute or treaty, whichever was enacted later will govern.
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governs the tax treatment of any foreign individual determined to be a
resident of any nation party to the treaty (the "contracting states").4 2
Because an individual may be treated as a resident of multiple countries for
purposes of taxation, and therefore subject to worldwide taxation of income
by multiple nations, 43 a tax treaty will also employ "tie-breaker" rules to
resolve cases of dual residency. 4
There are two types of tax treaties: bilateral (two countries) and
multilateral (multiple countries). Bilateral tax agreements are more
common today than multilateral tax treaties,45 because each nation's tax
system is unique and complex; it is not practical to develop or attempt
negotiation of general multilateral tax agreements along the lines of such
international economic agreements as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT"). 46 On the other hand, it has been argued that bilateral
tax treaties "do not represent the ideal resolution but merely serve as a
practical response to the double taxation problem., 47  The most glaring
problem with bilateral treaties is their lack of uniformity, despite attempts
to achieve such uniformity through common starting points.48 Multilateral
tax treaties address this issue by increasing tax uniformity amongst the
larger number of contracting states. However, multilateral tax treaties
generally work best when applied to discrete or specific issues of taxation.
49
See PAUL R. MCDANIEL, HUGH J. AULT, & JAMES R. REPETTI, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 178 (5th ed. 2005).
42 Tax treaties only apply to residents of the countries that are part of the formal
agreement-the "contracting states." Residence in a tax treaty is generally defined "by
reference to the definition of a resident for tax purposes under the domestic tax laws of the
country at issue." Berman, supra note 4, at 610-11.
43 See supra Part II.A. 1.
4Berman, supra note 4, at 612.
45 There are approximately 2000 bilateral tax treaties currently in place around the world.
See Richard L. Reinhold, Some Things That Multilateral Tax Treaties Might Usefully Do, 57
TAX LAW. 661, 662 (2003-2004). In contrast, multilateral tax treaties are limited in number.
For further discussion of multilateral tax treaties, see infra note 50.
46 See Berman, supra note 4, at 631.
47 Evans, supra note 4, at 305. A similar viewpoint is expressed that "[i]n many ways,
tax treaties are like dinosaurs in the modem world of international trade. They are bilateral
in a world of multilateral trade agreements, and they take just short of forever to conclude."
Mitchell, supra note 19, at 210.
48 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 210. See also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the three
common points of reference for beginning tax treaty negotiations).
49 Multilateral tax treaties, although rare, include the following: Convention Between the
Nordic Countries for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income
and on Capital, Sept. 23, 1996, 98 TAX NOTES INT'L (TA) 9-25 (signed by Denmark, Faroe
Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden); Cartagena Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation Among Member Countries, Nov. 16, 1971, 94 TAX NOTES INT'L (TA) 109-
34 (signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela); Agreement on the
Avoidance of Double Taxation on the Income and Property of Bodies Corporate, May 19,
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1. Starting Points for Tax Treaty Negotiations
All bilateral tax treaty negotiations begin with common points of
reference, of which there are generally three: (1) the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development Model Tax Convention (the
"OECD Model Treaty"), most recently revised in 2005,50 (2) the United
States Model Tax Convention (the "U.S. Model Tax Treaty") published in
1996, 51 and (3) the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention
between Developed and Developing Countries (the "U.N. Model Treaty"),
published in 1980.52
The United States has been closely involved with the development of
the OECD Model Treaty, and thus there are relatively minor differences
between that and the U.S. Model Tax Treaty.53 Generally, the U.S. policy is
to favor residence-based taxation.54  In contrast, the U.N. Model Treaty
tends to permit higher levels of taxation by the source country because it
was developed as a starting point for negotiations between developed and
developing countries.55 Tax treaties currently in place between the United
States and other countries in the Americas vary slightly from these models;
however, this variance, even if slight, creates a lack of uniformity amongst
1978, 1181 U.N.T.S. 131 (signed by Bulgaria, Czechloslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, and
Poland); Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Personal Income and Property,
May 27, 1977, 1181 U.N.T.S. 117 (signed by Bulgaria, Czechloslovakia, Hungary,
Mongolia, and Poland); Agreement Among the Governments of the Member States of the
Caribbean Community for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, Profits, or Gains and Capital Gains and for the
Encouragement of Regional Trade and Investment, July 6, 1994, 95 TAX NOTES INT'L 235-
37 (signed by Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent,
and Trinidad & Tobago). Of these treaties, only the Nordic and Caribbean treaties are
comprehensive income tax treaties based on the concepts of the OECD Model Treaty. The
others are limited in scope to either personal income or property. See Reinhold, supra note
45, at 669 n.34.
50 OECD, ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES OF INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL 1 (July 15, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/49/353638
40.pdf.
51 United States Model Income Tax Convention, Convention Between the United States
and for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With
Respect to Taxes on Income 1 (Sept. 20, 1996), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/model996.pdf (hereinafter U.S. Model Tax
Treaty).
52 U.N. Department of International Economic & Social Affairs, U.N. Model Double for
Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/102 (1980).
53 Berman, supra note 4, at 630-31.
54 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 228.
55 Berman, supra note 4, at 631; see infra Part III.A (discussing the reasons why
developing countries prefer source-based taxation and developed countries prefer residence-
based taxation).
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the bilateral tax treaties currently in place.
2. Tax Treaties in North America
The United States currently has separate bilateral tax treaties in place
with Canada ("U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty") 56 and Mexico ("U.S.-Mexico Tax
Treaty"). 57  Both of these treaties function in a similar fashion and in
accordance with the U.S. Model Tax Treaty. Under both the U.S.-Canada
Tax Treaty and the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty, an athlete's income from
personal services is attributed to and taxed in the country where the
personal services were performed-the source country. The source country
taxes in accordance with its domestic law and is not restricted by the tax
treaty. The country of residence is then obligated by the treaty to eliminate
double taxation for the taxpayer. Thus, both these treaties contain
provisions relevant to the tax treatment of international athletes: (1) "tie-
breaker" provisions to determine an individual's country of residence, 58 (2)
an "Artiste and Athlete Article" attributing the right to tax services
performed to the source country, 59 and (3) provisions to relieve the
individual from double taxation of the same income.
60
a. "Tie-Breaker" Provisions for Determining Residency
Both the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty and the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty
contain similar language for determining residence, and function in the
same manner. Where an individual is a resident of both contracting states,
then his status shall be determined as follows: (a) if "he has a permanent
home available to him" in a country, "he shall be deemed to be a resident of
the [s]tate;" if he has a permanent home in both contracting states or in
neither contracting state, "he shall be deemed to be a resident of the [s]tate
with which his personal and economic relations are closer (center of vital
56 Convention between the United States of America and Canada with respect to Taxes
on Income and on Capital, Sept. 26, 1980, 1469 U.N.T.S. 189, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/canada.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty].
57 Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992, 93 T.N.I.
131-15, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/mexico.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico
Tax Treaty].
" See infra Part II.B.2.a (discussing tie-breaker provisions of the U.S.-Canada Tax
Treaty and the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty respectively).
" See infra Part II.B.2.b.i, (reviewing the Artiste and Athlete Article of the U.S.-Canada
Tax Treaty); see also Part II.B.2.b.ii (reviewing the Artiste and Athlete Article of the U.S.-
Mexico Tax Treaty).
60 See infra Part II.B.2.c.i, (assessing the relief of double taxation under the U.S.-Canada
Tax Treaty); see also Part II.B.2.c.ii (assessing the relief of double taxation under the U.S.-
Mexico Tax Treaty).
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interests);" (b) if the individual's center of vital interests cannot be
determined, and he does not have a permanent residence in either country,
he shall be deemed to be a resident of the state where he has a habitual
abode; (c) if he has a habitual abode in both states or in neither of them, he
shall be deemed to be a resident of the state of which he is a citizen; (d) "in
any other case, the competent authorities of the [c]ontracting [s]tates shall
settle the question by mutual agreement."
6
'
Again, these "tie-breaker" provisions are important because of the
possible overlap of tests for residency among the contracting states.62 In
other words, these provisions ensure resolution of the issue arising when the
same individual may be determined to be a taxable resident of more than
one nation and therefore subject to taxation on worldwide income.63
b. Artistes and Athletes Articles
The U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty and the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty are also
very similar with respect to the attribution of tax jurisdiction on income
earned by an artiste or athlete to the source country. Substantively, both
articles are general in discussion and only three paragraphs in length.
However, there are some important differences, as discussed below.
i. U.S.-Canada Treaty
Article XVI of the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty states as follows: "income
derived . . . as an entertainer . . . or as an athlete, from his personal
activities" exercised in the other contracting state, may be taxed in the
source nation, "except where the amount of the gross receipts derived by
such entertainer or athlete, including expenses reimbursed to him or borne
on his behalf, from such activities do not exceed fifteen thousand dollars
($15,000) in the currency of that other State for the calendar year
concerned., 64 Therefore, any individual performing the services described,
and receiving $15,000 or less in compensation falls outside the scope of this
treaty and will be taxed in the country of residence only.
Moreover, this treaty specifically exempts application of Article XVI
to the "income of an athlete in respect of an employment with a team which
participates in a league with regularly schedule [sic] games in both
contracting states., 65  This provision was probably inserted to allow
61 U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty, supra note 57, art. 4; U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, supra note 56,
at art. IV.
62 See supra Part II.A. 1.
63 See Bennan, supra note 4, at 612.
64 U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, supra note 56, art. XVI, § 1.
65 Id. art. XVI, § 3.
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residence-based taxation of professional athletes in basketball, hockey, and
baseball who earn substantial sums of money but frequently travel between
the United States and Canada for competition.66
ii. U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty
Article 18 of the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty states that "income derived
as an entertainer, ... or as an athlete, from his personal activities" may
be taxed in the source nation, "except where the amount of the
remuneration derived by such entertainer or athlete, including expenses
reimbursed to him or borne on his behalf, from such activities does not
exceed $3,000 United States dollars or its equivalent in Mexican pesos for
the taxable year concerned., 67 Therefore, for example, a resident of Mexico
will be exempt from the coverage of this tax treaty if he receives $3,000 or
less in compensation for services performed in the United States.
Moreover, an artiste or athlete's income is exempt from this Article if the
visit to the other contracting state "is substantially supported by public
funds" of the athlete's country of residence.68
Thus, there are several key differences regarding the tax treatment of
athletes covered under these two tax treaties. The first and most glaring is
the different minimum thresholds of income required for exemption from
coverage: $3,000 for the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty and $15,000 for the U.S.-
Canada Tax Treaty. In addition, there is a difference in application to
professional athletes or those athletes whose visit is supported by public
funds of the athlete's resident nation. This, again, highlights the
problematic lack of uniformity through the use of bilateral tax treaties.
c. Relief from Double Taxation
In the case of eliminating double taxation for the individual, an
individual determined to be a resident of the United States is treated
similarly under both treaties. However, the treaties differ with respect to
individuals determined to be residents of Canada or Mexico respectively.
i. U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty
According to Article XXIV of the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, the United
States "shall allow to a citizen or resident of the United States . . . as a
credit against the United States tax on income the appropriate amount of
66 For the respective 2004-2005 seasons, there were the following Canadian professional
teams: one in Major League Baseball (Toronto), one in the National Basketball League
(Toronto), and six in the National Hockey League (Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver,
Calgary and Edmonton).
67 U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty, supra note 57, art. 18, § 1.
68 Id. art. 18, § 3.
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income tax paid or accrued to Canada."69 This is similar treatment to the
I.R.C. foreign tax credit discussed above, 70 but more efficient because of its
specific application to income derived in Canada. The article specifically
limits the amount of any allowable foreign tax credit paid to Canada to "that
proportion of the United States tax that taxable income arising in Canada
bears to the entire taxable income.",
71
However, in the case of Canada, double taxation is eliminated as
follows: "income tax paid or accrued to the United States on profits, income
or gains arising in the United States shall be deducted from any Canadian
tax payable in respect of such profits, income or gains. 72 Thus, Canada
employs an income tax deduction for taxes paid to the United States. The
treaty places further limitations on U.S. citizens who have been determined
to be residents of Canada under the "tie-breaker" provisions of Article
XXIV: (a) the Canadian deduction for income tax paid or accrued in the
United States shall "not exceed the amount of the tax that would be paid to
the United States if the resident were not a United States citizen; '73 and (b)
the U.S. foreign tax credit shall not "reduce that portion of the United States
tax that is deductible from Canadian tax.",
74
ii. U.S. -Mexico Tax Treaty
Under Article 24 of the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty, the contracting states
have agreed to "allow to a resident of that State and, in the case of the
United States to a citizen of the United States, as a credit against the income
tax of that State ... the income tax paid to the other Contracting State by or
on behalf of such resident or citizen., 75 Moreover, the treaty permits each
contracting state to apply domestic law limitations and provisions on credits
for income taxes paid. 6 Thus, under the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty, both
Mexico and the United States agree to use a foreign tax credit.
69 U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, supra note 56, art. XXIV, § 1; U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty,
supra note 57, art. 24, § 1.
70 See supra Part II.A.2.
71 U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, supra note 56, art. XXIV, § 1.
72 Id. art. XXIV, § 2(a). The availability of these deductions is "[s]ubject to the
provisions of the law of Canada regarding the deduction from tax payable in Canada of tax
paid in a territory outside Canada . Id.
71 Id. art. XXIV, § 4(a).
14 Id. art. XXIV, § 4(b).
75 U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty, supra note 57, art. 24, §§ 1, l(a).
76 Id. art. 24, § 1.
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III. TAX TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS WITH
SOUTH AMERICA
There are certain countries in South America where fundamental
differences in political or governmental philosophy (i.e. Columbia 77 and
Venezuela7 8) present clear obstacles to the prospect of building long-term
economic relationships. However, other developing economies (i.e. Brazil,
Argentina and Chile) are viable candidates for the strengthening of U.S.
foreign economic relations. These developing economies are the key areas
for the potential development of free trade in the Americas.79 Similarly, the
United States is currently in discussions to open up free trade with Central
America, which proponents believe reflect the U.S. need to further
economic ties in the Americas.80 To date, however, the United States has
77 In 1994, the United States and others in Columbia charged its then current president,
Ernesto Samper, with receiving roughly six million dollars of election campaign funds from
a drug cartel in Cali. See Albert R. Coll, United States Strategic Interests in Latin America:
An Assessment, 39 J. INTERAMERICAN STUDIES WORLD AFF. (Special Issue: US-Latin
American Relations) 45, 50 (1997). The obvious problem of drugs-particularly that over
ninety percent of U.S. cocaine came from Columbia-and other issues prompted the U.S.
government to formulate a specific policy towards Columbia to battle the drug problem as
well as improve democracy and human rights in Columbia. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, A
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS COLUMBIA AND OTHER RELATED
ISSUES (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rpt/17140.htm. As a result,
relations have been marked by steady progress in battling Columbian drug trafficking and
terrorism, although a continuing an integrated effort is needed to sustain Columbia's
stability. See Plan Columbia: Major Success and New Challenges: Hearing Before the H.
Int'l Relations Comm., 109th Cong., (2005) (statement of Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Sec'y,
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Dept. of State), available at,
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2005/q2/46564.htm and 2005 WL 1120988.
78 As recently as December 2005, the U.S. State Department issued a release stating that
democracy in Venezuela was in "grave peril" calling for inter-American intervention to
address the problems of: "unchecked concentration of power in the executive; politicization
of the judiciary, the electoral authorities, and the legal system; political persecution of civil
society and the democratic opposition; intimidation of the press; and threats to free
association." U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, STATE DEMOCRACY IN
VENEZUELA (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/5771
4.pdf.
79 For example, "[a]ccording to one calculation, an FTAA could result in the doubling of
U.S. trade with Brazil in the short term alone ..." Feinberg, supra note 6, at 132 (citing
Jeffrey Schott & Gary C. Hufbauer, Whither the Free Trade Area of the Americas?, WORLD
ECON. 22, Aug. 1999, at 778-82).
80 Proponents of CAFTA argue the agreement will (1) dramatically expand U.S. exports
into the growing markets of Central America, (2) support freedom, democracy and economic
reform in the United States' own backyard, (3) allow for better competition with Asian
markets of textiles and (4) provide better protection of labor and human rights; additionally,
CAFTA will have minimal impact on sugar imports, a major area of concern with the
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been unable to successfully negotiate and sign a tax treaty with any country
in South America.
A. The Traditional Sticking Point of Tax Treaties Between Developed and
Developing Countries
The United States adheres to the general economic principle of Capital
Export Neutrality, where a "tax system seeks to impose the same tax
burdens on the invested capital of its resident companies regardless of
whether the capital is invested at home or abroad.",81 In practical terms, this
means that the United States seeks to avoid domestic companies setting up
investments or operations abroad based simply on tax incentives.82 The
principle of Capital Export Neutrality also underscores why the United
States generally prefers residence-based taxation over source-based
taxation. Where two developed economies enter into a tax treaty, the
income flow between the two countries will be more or less equal, absent
any tax incentives encouraging otherwise;84 attributing the authority to tax
to the country of residence is the most equitable mechanism for determining
tax jurisdiction.85
However, this same analysis reveals opposing interests between
developed and developing countries in negotiating tax treaties. Most likely,
the developed economy will be a net exporter of capital, goods, and services
while the developing country will likely be a net importer. 86 Residence-
based taxation presents a perceived unfair flow of tax revenues based on the
clear imbalance in the flow of goods and services. 87 More specifically, the
tax revenue of the developed country will almost certainly increase at the
expense of the developing country's treasury. 88  Thus, developing
economies seek tax treaties that "allow for greater source jurisdiction to tax
dividends and interest, inculcate minimal permanent establishment
thresholds for source-based taxation of trade or business income, and create
some incentive for foreign investors to invest in the developing country. '8 9
81 Berman, supra note 4, at 610.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See Mitchell, supra note 19, at 227.
85 In these circumstances, "both countries forego roughly equal amounts of source based
tax dollars in exchange for roughly equal amounts of residence based tax dollars." Mitchell,




89 Id. at 228. The term "permanent establishment" is important for use in tax treaties:
"[i]ncome attributable to a permanent establishment is not the same as income effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States. You need not have a
permanent establishment in the United States to be engaged in trade or business in the
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Thus far, the United States has been comparatively inflexible when dealing
with tax treaty negotiations of developing countries. 90
B. Negotiations Between the United States and Brazil
Aside from the traditional sticking point between developed and
developing countries, each nation's tax system presents unique challenges
when developing and negotiating a tax treaty. A detailed analysis of such
issues between the United States and every South American country is
beyond the scope of this article. However, an exemplary analysis of the
issues encountered during the U.S.-Brazil tax treaty negotiations will help
shed some light on the subject.
1. Why Brazil is an Important Economic Partner
In recent years, Brazil has shown that it is determined to transform
itself into a "true global economic power." 91 It boasts the ninth largest
economy in the world and encompasses almost half of the total population,
territory and economic output of South America.92 Looking to the future, it
also "possesses large and well-developed agricultural, mining,
manufacturing and service" industries.93 Relations between Brazil and the
United States are strong, and "[a]s Brazil lowers trade and foreign
investment barriers, more U.S. companies will find Brazil's large and
dynamic market an attractive option."9
The U.S. government has also identified Brazil as a "Big Emerging
Market., 95 This signals a commitment by the U.S. government to assist
domestic attempts to invest and enter business in the expanding Brazilian
market.96 Brazil maintains significant economic relationships with other
developed countries, where tax treaties already in place may make goods,
services and capital from those countries cheaper to Brazil than similar
United States." BISCHEL & FE1NSCHEIBER, supra note 20, at 208.
90 Although the United States has been unsuccessful in developing tax treaties, it has
designed a program to aid the IRS in enforcing its income tax laws and enhancing
compliance in the Americas. These tax information exchange agreements (TIEA's) obligate
the signatory nations to cooperate with the United States on civil and criminal tax
investigations, with an ultimate goal of concluding tax treaties. See Bruce Zagaris, The
Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and
No Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 331, 331-33 (2003).
91 Matthew S. Poulter, My Client's Going to Brazil: A U.S. Practitioner's Guide to
Brazilian Limitadas Under the New Civil Code, 11 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 133, 134 (2005).
92 Id.
93 id.
94 Id. at 134-35.
95 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 226.
96 id.
Taxing the International Athlete
27:227 (2006)
exports from the United States.97  In addition, this is a good time for
developing negotiations as Brazil has seen the benefits gained by Mexico
and Canada through free trade agreements with the United States.9
2. Tax Treaty Issues Between the United States and Brazil
The United States and Brazil first began negotiations over a tax treaty
as early as 1949.99 Yet, despite over fifty years of negotiations, the United
States and Brazil have been unable to develop a tax treaty successfully.
There are generally two important issues that have yet to be resolved in
U.S.-Brazil tax treaty negotiations: (1) the availability of United States tax
sparing, and (2) the taxation of fees for technical services.'0 0
a. Tax Sparing
Tax sparing grants "domestic taxpayers a foreign tax credit for foreign
taxes not actually paid."''1  This occurs through the guarantee that a
developed country will give residents (as determined by the treaty) a
foreign tax credit for certain taxes, whether or not they are actually paid.
This tax credit, in turn, provides an incentive for foreign investment in the
developing country.10 2  While other developed countries are willing to
extend tax sparing to developing countries,'O
3 the United States is not. 10 4
97 Id. Also, as Mitchell notes, "[n]ot only does this threaten the [U.S.] current market
share in Brazil, but it also allows foreign businesses to establish themselves in Brazilian
markets for the long term." Id. at 226-27.
98 See Poulter, supra note 91, at 135.
99 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 222.
"' Id. at 229.
101 Id.
102 Id. As Deborah Toaze notes:
Developing countries often attempt to attract foreign investors with incentives in
the form of reduced rates of taxation or, in some cases, the exemption of certain
types of income from tax. In order to preserve the resultant investment revenues to
the developing country, the country of residence of the investor (that is, the
developed country) "spares" the tax that it would normally impose on the low-
taxed or untaxed income earned by its resident abroad by granting foreign tax
credits equal to, or possibly greater than, the tax that would otherwise have been
exigible in the developing country.
Deborah Toaze, Tax Sparing: Good Intentions, Unintended Results, 49 CAN. TAX J. 879,
880-81 (2001).
103 Mitchell provides the following example to highlight how tax sparing works under the
Brazil-Netherlands tax treaty:
If a Dutch lender receives ten dollars of interest from a Brazilian resident in a
taxable year, the income would be subject to Brazil's fifteen percent withholding
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The United States has put forth several reasons for refusing to grant tax
sparing in tax treaties with developing countries.
First, the United States has taken the paternalistic view that such a
provision would "encourage investors to 'shop' for deals, and unwisely
erode the developing country's . . . revenue base."' 0 5 Moreover, according
to the United States, such tax sparing schemes are irrational, unstable, and
"promote[] repatriation of funds by investors rather than the reinvestment of
,,106income in business expansion. In this regard, the United States stands by
the principle of Capital Export Neutrality: U.S. tax law does not (and thus
international tax law should not) favor either domestic or international
transactions. 1
07
Second, tax sparing runs contrary to the U.S. policy of "using a tax
treaty to provide US [sic] benefits to non-residents and foreign tax benefits
to US [sic] residents."' 1 8 Correspondingly, tax sparing reduces U.S. control
over taxation of its residents because the foreign government is functionally
allowed to set tax incentives. 10 9  The practical effect, therefore, is that
foreign governments will determine U.S. tax rates on income earned abroad
by U.S. residents." 0 Allowing a foreign government to set U.S. tax rates,
whether directly or indirectly, may be unacceptable from both a policy and
constitutional standpoint. ' 1
And finally, it is likely that granting tax sparing to Brazil "will set an
undesired precedent for future negotiations" between the United States and
other developing countries.' 12 This is unlikely to happen, particularly in
light of recent arguments that the OECD Model Treaty is moving closer to
tax, which is the maximum percentage permitted under the treaty (with some
exceptions). Under the tax sparing provision, the interest is exempt from tax in the
Netherlands. In addition, the Dutch lender is allowed a tax credit in the
Netherlands equal to a deemed paid tax of twenty percent of the interest. Thus, the
taxpayer pays one dollar and fifty cents in tax and receives two dollars in tax
credits, netting an extra fifty cents of income at the expense of the Dutch
treasury[.]
Mitchell, supra note 19, at 229.
104 See Toaze, supra note 102, at 883-88 (discussing the changing position of the United
States from initial support for tax sparing with developing countries in the 1950s to its
current position of opposition).
105 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 230 (quoting David R. Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 50
U. MIAMI L. REv. 455,474-75 (1996)).106 Toaze, supra note 102, at 887.
107 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 230.




112 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 230.
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the U.S. position and away from tax sparing.'
1 3
b. Withholding of Fees for Technical Services
Brazilian domestic tax law subjects fees remitted abroad for technical
assistance to a source-based withholding tax and seeks for its treaties to
preserve this right.1 14  Thus, Brazilian tax treaties maintain the right for
Brazil to withhold ten to fifteen percent of any kind of payments received
for rendering technical assistance and technical services. 15  In practice,
"Brazilian tax authorities have interpreted the phrase 'technical services'
broadly, to encompass ...most kinds of services.'' 16 For example, in
February 2005, Brazilian tax authorities ruled that "the concept of Royalties
includes (for the application of the Brazil-Spain tax treaty) all services
including or not [sic] a transfer of technology or know-how and for which
the underlying contracts" are subject to 12.5% withholding tax under the
Brazil-Spain Convention for the Avoidance for Double Taxation.117  In
contrast, the U.S. Model Treaty requires fees for services to be attributed to
113 See Toaze, supra note 102, at 888-90 (analyzing the OECD's evolution to its current
position of no longer granting tax sparing to developing countries on an unquestioning
basis).
114 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 231.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 N6lio Weiss & Philippe Jeffrey, Brazil: Tax Treaty with Spain Clarified, INT'L TAX
REv., Feb. 2005, at 44, available at http://www.intemationaltaxreview.com/?Page=10&PUB
ID=35&ISS=14050&SID=494272&TYPE=20. In addition, Weiss and Jeffrey note:
The Brazilian tax authorities have always been very reluctant in applying the
business profits principle to exempt income not subject to withholding income tax
under a specific article of a treaty (that is, income other than dividends, interest, or
royalties). Instead, income such as service fees derived by residents of a treaty
country is assumed to be subject to Brazil's withholding income tax under the
"Income Not Expressly Mentioned" or "Other Income" article of the treaty and
thereby taxable in accordance with domestic law. In this regard, the Brazilian tax
authorities had previously issued on January 5, 2000 the Declaratory Act 1/2000,
which had unified the official position of the Federal Revenue Department on the
proper treatment of withholding taxes for technical service payments remitted
outside Brazil.
According to the Declaratory Act, payments made abroad for technical services
without transfer of technology should be governed by the article in a tax treaty
dealing with "Other Income" and accordingly, be subject to a 15% withholding
income tax. As a general rule, the latter should remain applicable for service fees
paid to a resident of a "treaty country" other than Spain.
Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:227 (2006)
the contracting state of residence for an individual's personal services. 1
8
Thus far, neither country has been willing to concede tax jurisdiction
on this point for two key reasons. First, as these services typically flow
from the United States to Brazil, Brazil stands to lose significant tax
revenue from a switch to residence-based taxation; they would not be
compensated by a parallel flow of services from Brazil to the United
States.11 9  This is a similar argument to the traditional sticking point
between developed and developing countries discussed above, but the
argument carries particular weight in this context. Here, both nations are
particularly interested in maintaining the tax revenue of technical
services-a growing sector of both economies. 120 Second, as discussed, the
U.S. policy of tax treaty neutrality is that tax treaties should eliminate tax-
based preferences. Brazil's fee withholding system on technical services
essentially creates a double taxation of services remitted abroad, giving
Brazilian domestic residents a competitive advantage. Correspondingly,
this makes U.S. services artificially more expensive and allows Brazil to
keep and create jobs for skilled residents. 121
IV. WORKING TOWARD FREE TRADE THROUGH TAXING THE
INTERNATIONAL ATHLETE
The world is undoubtedly moving toward a greater interconnectivity of
national economies through globalization. The benefits of this economic
globalization include better allocation of world resources to increase output
and standards of living, a greater range of choice in goods and services due
to the greater access to foreign goods, the ability to visit far away places
due to significantly decreased costs of travel and access to a wider range of
information at a lower cost. 122 Correspondingly, since World War II, "a
significant part of economic development projects and structural adjustment
programs for developing ... countries" have centered on tax reform.' 23 A
tax treaty is often seen as the first step in building and sustaining a
substantial economic relationship with a foreign nation.
124
In this regard, a multilateral tax treaty in the Americas will go far in
118 See U.S. Model Tax Treaty, supra note 51, art. 14, 15 (discussing residence-based
taxation for both dependent and independent personal services respectively).
119 Mitchell, supra note 19, at 232.
120 Id. at 231-32.
121 Id. at 232.
122 Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in
Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 139, 140 (2003) (quoting VITO
TANZI, GLOBALIZATION, TAX COMPETITION AND THE FUTURE OF TAX SYSTEMS 4 (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 141, 1996)).
123 Id. at 141.
11 See id. at 148. As Stewart notes, a tax treaty with a developing economy "is often
presented as an important symbol of international capitalist engagement." Id.
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developing economic relationships and encouraging continued efforts
toward embracing free trade. Addressing the taxation issues facing the
international athlete is optimal for application here for several reasons.
First, the singular issue of taxing the international athlete is ideal for
imposition of a multilateral tax treaty in the Americas.1 25  Second, a
multilateral tax treaty will address a fundamental tax policy problem
produced by the lack of uniformity in today's system of bilateral tax
treaties: horizontal tax equity.1 26 Third, getting a tax treaty finalized for this
discrete issue will likely lead to further agreements through opening the
lines of communication between contracting states' "competent
authorities."'' 27  Finally, because of the inherently public nature of
international athletes, the United States will benefit from the goodwill
created by such an agreement and thereby soften its image as an inflexible
country when negotiating tax treaties with developing countries. 128
A. An Ideal Issue for a Multilateral Tax Treaty
Although the bilateral tax treaty is far more common in today's world
of international taxation, the use of multilateral tax treaties organized
around an issue (rather than geographical proximity) has proven to be very
effective. For example, the European Union's treaty on the Elimination of
Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits and
Associated Enterprises 29 was concluded specifically for the purpose of
settling transfer-pricing issues.13  Another example is the Multilateral
125 See infra Part IV.A.
126 See infra Part IV.B.
127 See infra Part IV.C.
128 See infra Part IV.D.
129 Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the
Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, July 23, 1990, 1847 U.N.T.S. 3.
This Convention was subsequently amended twice. When Austria, Finland, and Sweden
joined the EU as Member States in 1995, the Arbitration Convention was supplemented by
adding a Convention that was signed December 21, 1995. Convention of 21 December 1995
Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the
Kingdom of Sweden to the Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in
Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, Official Journal, 1996
O.J. (C 26) of 31/01/96, 1-33, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ
.do?uri=CELEX:41996A0331(01):en:HTML. Prior to the expiration of the five-year
application period of the Arbitration Convention, the Council adopted a Protocol providing
for an automatic extension of the Convention for consecutive five year periods unless
opposed by a Contracting State. Protocol of 25 May 1999 Amending the Convention of 23
July 1990 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of
Profits of Associated Enterprises, Official Journal, 1999 O.J. (C 202), 16/07/99, 1-11,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C: 1999:202:SOM:en:HTML
(amended by a convention signed Dec. 21, 1995, and a protocol signed May 25, 1999).
130 This multilateral tax treaty also represents an innovative structure adopting a system
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Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters signed by
the member states of the Council of Europe and the OECD member states
in 1988.131 This treaty was concluded specifically for the purpose of
providing administrative assistance in tax collection and service documents
through the transfer of information.132  It is also important because it
represents the first multilateral tax treaty to which the United States is a
party. 133 Additionally, Richard Reinhold recently argued that the emerging
market of e-commerce represents another good environment for the
development of a multilateral tax treaty. 134 These previous examples,
therefore, lend support to the idea that a multilateral tax treaty can be
implemented in other areas.
The narrow area of taxation of international athletes is an ideal
singular issue for developing a multilateral tax treaty in the Americas. As
discussed above, the "Artiste and Athlete Articles" of both the U.S.-Canada
Tax Treaty and U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty are general in their coverage and
short in length. 135 This exemplifies the concern that "although bilateral tax
treaties cover a wide gamut of tax issues, the comprehensiveness comes at
the expense of accuracy and detail with respect to each article."' 36 Yet, the
taxation of international athletes deserves more consideration due to its
unique position within the realm of international taxation of personal
services. 37 The traditional personal service provisions of U.S. tax treaties
allow residence-based taxation for the performance of personal services
abroad.'38  In contrast, international athletes are subject to source-based
taxation. 139 Therefore, it has been argued that the primary reason for the
"Artiste and Athlete Article" in bilateral tax treaties is revenue generation
and not relief from double taxation. 140 Because this unique set of taxpayers
differs from all others in their tax jurisdiction for performance of personal
for arbitration among tax authorities to resolve issues of transfer pricing. See Evans, supra
note 4, at 318.
131 Council of Europe-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, Jan. 25, 1988, 90 T.N.I.
26-52, Europ. T.S. No. 127, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html
/127.htm.
132 Evans, supra note 4, at 318.
133 Id. at 319.
134 See generally Reinhold, supra note 45.
H5 See supra Part II.B.2.b.
136 Evans, supra note 4, at 328.
137 Id. at 327-28 (discussing in detail why the U.S. Model Tax Treaty allows for source-
based jurisdiction of athletes, while other personal services are subjected to residence-based
taxation).
138 See U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, supra note 56, art. XIV-XV; see also U.S.-Mexico Tax
Treaty, supra note 57, art. 14-15.
139 See supra Part II.B.2.b.
140 See Evans, supra note 4, at 328.
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services, more detailed tax provisions will ensure an efficient allocation of
tax revenue while better protecting the individual from double taxation.
In addition, the traditional desire of the United States for residence-
based taxation141 will not present the usual barriers to successful negotiation
with developing countries. Although the U.S. Model Tax Treaty requires
residence-based taxation for all other personal services, 142 artistes and
athletes are currently taxed under source-based taxation principles. 143 Both
the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty and the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty allow for such
an approach. Thus, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the developing
economies of South America are predisposed to agree on fundamental tax
policy with regard to taxing the international athlete.
Finally, this category of taxpayers-international athletes-is
inherently narrow and discrete.""' There will be relatively minimal
administrative costs because an athlete performing services in multiple
countries will be easy to track. The taxation effectiveness and appreciation
by countries party to the treaty can be easily measured. Thus, the
administrative ease of implementation supports the feasibility of a
multilateral tax treaty around this singular issue.
B. Horizontal Tax Equity
Concepts of equity and fairness represent the cornerstone of sound tax
policy. 45 In this regard, horizontal tax equity stands for the proposition that
similar taxpayers should be taxed alike. 146 Moreover, this principle has
been called the "basic yardstick used to gauge whether tax burdens are
fairly distributed."' 147  Under today's practices, the lack of uniformity
between bilateral tax treaties violates this principle.
International athletes from Mexico and Canada are subject to different
thresholds for calculating amounts exempt from income generated from
their services in the United States. 148 Although these minimal threshold
amounts may be of no consequence to professional athletes well beyond
exemption, there is the possibility for disparity when applied to lower
141 See supra Part III.A (discussing why the United States, and most developed countries,
prefer residence-based taxation when negotiating treaties with developing economies).
142 See U.S. Model Tax Treaty, supra note 51, art. 14, 15.
143 See supra Part II.B.2.
144 See Evans, supra note 4, at 329.
145 See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, And Equal (Tax) Justice for All? in TAX JUSTICE: THE
ONGOING DEBATE 253, 257-58 (Joseph J. Thomdike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002).
146 Id. at 258.
147 JOSEPH C. CORDES, Horizontal Equity in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX
POLICY 164, 164 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 1999).
148 See supra Parts II.B.2.b.i, II.B.2.b.ii (discussing the minimum amount of exemption
levels for the U.S-Canada Tax Treaty and the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty respectively).
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income athletes. For example, the United States will treat an athlete who
earns ten thousand dollars for athletic services performed in the United
States (assuming all else is equal) during a taxable year differently
depending only on whether he is defined as a resident of Canada or Mexico.
If the athlete were a resident of Mexico, then, under the U.S-Mexico Tax
Treaty, the entire amount of income would be taxed according to U.S. law,
with the availability of a foreign tax credit to the individual's tax liability in
Mexico. 149  However, this same athlete determined to be a resident of
Canada under the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty would not be subject to U.S. tax
jurisdiction at all. 5 ° This represents an inequitable determination of tax
liability based solely on country of residence.
A multilateral tax treaty, in which each contracting state would subject
individuals to source-based income from athletic services with the same
exemption threshold (if any), would remove this lack of uniformity. It
would also employ its own "tie-breaker" rules for proper determination of
residency, thereby ensuring better predictability of tax jurisdiction for
athletes competing in multiple contracting states. Moreover, in doing so,
the tax treaty would ensure an equal application of tax jurisdiction, avoiding
tax discrimination based solely upon country of residence. 
5 1
C. Communication Between "Competent Authorities"
An important procedural aspect of tax treaties is that they allow the tax
authorities of respective contracting states to establish a direct line of
communications.' 2 These so-called "competent authority" provisions are
created primarily as a mechanism for taxpayers to ensure that their rights
under the treaty are respected by the taxing authorities of the contracting
states. 153  But the more important element, for purposes of building
economic relationships, may be the simple development of open
communications. In terms of a bilateral tax treaty, "rather than
communicating exclusively through diplomatic channels, the treaty
authorizes the 'competent authorities' of the two countries to negotiate with
each other and reach binding mutual agreements on the interpretation and
application of the tax treaty." 5
54
149 See U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty, supra note 57, art. 18, § 1 (the exemption threshold is
$3,000).
150 See U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, supra note 56, art. XVI, § 1 (highlighting, here, that the
exemption threshold is $15,000).
151 According to Cordes, horizontal equity "protects taxpayers against arbitrary
discrimination, and also seems consistent with basic principles of equal worth. Some might
also argue that horizontal equity comports with the principle of 'equal protection under law'
set forth in the United States Constitution." CORDES, supra note 147, at 164.
152 Berman, supra note 4, at 623.
153 See McDANIEL, AULT & REPETTI, supra note 41, at 194.
154 Berman, supra note 4, at 623.
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This direct communication between each nation's taxing authorities
could be very beneficial in working through the current problems faced in
tax treaty negotiations between the United States and South American
countries.1 55 For example, a fundamental disagreement between the United
States and Brazil is the Brazilian approach toward withholding fees for
technical services.156 The fundamental concern of U.S. tax authorities is
how broadly the Brazilian tax authorities may interpret such services.
Opening communications between the taxing authorities may result in a
better understanding of each side's opposing position, resulting in a
mutually agreeable and beneficial interpretation of technical services.
D. Creation of Goodwill and Lasting Economic Relationships
Finally, it has been argued that the United States needs to develop a
more flexible approach toward international tax relationships with
developing countries.157  Formally addressing the taxation issues of
international athletes from these countries is an avenue for pursuing a more
flexible approach.
Due to escalating salary and endorsement values, it is feasible that tax
authorities may become increasingly interested in the issues surrounding the
taxation of professional athletes. Domestic professional athletes have
already experienced increased tax scrutiny from traveling within the United
States, in the form of the so-called 'jock taxes."' 158  International
professional athletes add another element to the equation because of the
concerns for double taxation and proper tax jurisdiction. Moreover, the
inherently public nature of sports figures puts them constantly at the
forefront of public attention and discussion. Thus, the international athlete
has potential to represent a high-profile issue of proper taxation.
155 As Evans notes, "[a] multilateral agreement would enable several countries to discuss
one specific tax issue-the taxation of international athletes. Meetings to negotiate this
agreement would foster increased opportunity for discussing issues in depth, solving
problems creatively, reaching compromises, and establishing a uniform system of tax
treatment." Evans, supra note 4, at 328-29.
156 See supra Part III.B.2.b.
157 See Zagaris, supra note 90, at 331-32 (arguing that "the inflexible approach of the
United States towards developing countries and the emphasis on 'sticks,' or punishment of
governments that do not change their policies and laws and conform with U.S. tax
enforcement demands, in lieu of 'carrots' or incentives is adversely impacting" the tax
environment between the United States and developing countries).
158 "Jock tax" is the "colloquial expression referring to a state's application of its income
tax to visiting professional athletes." David K. Hoffman & Scott A. Hodge, Nonresident
State and Local Income Taxes in the United States: The Continuing Spread of Jock Taxes,
TAX FOUND., SPECIAL REPORT No. 130 2 (July 2004), available at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/94.html. As Hoffman and Hodge also note,
"[p]rofessional athletes make tempting targets for state lawmakers because they represent a
highly concentrated pool of wealth that can be taxed with little enforcement." Id. at 4.
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Directly addressing the taxation issues facing international sports
figures is a perfect avenue to increase the positive reputation of
international relations while simultaneously building toward an integrated
economic future. First, the United States can approach the negotiations
with a flexible attitude on this singular issue without fear of setting an
undesired precedent of tax agreements with other developing countries.15 9
Second, and similarly, signing such a multilateral tax treaty will help bring
national and international attention to the issue of building economic
relations between the United States and South American countries.
Finally, this approach would also finalize international taxation issues
throughout the Americas for at least one issue. This "foot-in-the-door"
approach makes sense because it will likely lead to further negotiations
down the road. If the representative countries cannot agree on something as
straightforward as taxing athletes, there will likely be continued problems
with negotiating more substantive tax treaties between the United States
and South American countries and ultimately problems in the development
of free trade in the Americas. As an example of success, the U.S.-Mexico
Tax Treaty was negotiated and signed in conjunction with development of
NAFTA. 160  The tax treaty is a critical complement to NAFTA for
achieving mutual benefits of investment, even though it generally operates
independently.' 6 1 The U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty has also been perceived as a
functional starting point and "model for tax treaties between the United
States and other Latin American countries." 162 Thus, if a multilateral tax
treaty around one singular issue in the Americas were executed, it would
likely lead to sustained economic relationships through continued
discussions.
V. CONCLUSION
There is currently no tax treaty in place with any South American
country. Similarly, recent attempts at discussion and negotiations toward
opening free trade in the Americas seem to have hit a standstill. A
multilateral tax treaty in the Americas will move all countries involved
closer to developing free trade by removing barriers to cross-border
transaction and investment.
Although no tax treaty is currently in place with any South American
country, high profile athletes such as Manu Ginobilli of Argentina have
159 See supra Part III.B.2.a (discussing the U.S. resistance to granting tax sparing to
Brazil for fear that it will lead to an undesired precedent for tax treaty negotiations with other
developing countries).
160 J.D. Dell & Geoffrey R. Polma, The New US-Mexico Income Tax Treaty: Overview
and Analysis, 1 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 49, 49 (1995).
161 id.
162 Id.
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raised the level of attention given to the issue of taxing the international
athlete. The United States should capitalize on this opportunity by pursuing
a multilateral tax treaty in the Americas on the singular issue of taxing the
international athlete. In pursuing such an agreement-where the United
States and developing countries already agree on the fundamental tax policy
of source-based tax jurisdiction-the United States will (1) remove the lack
of uniformity currently presented by the various bilateral tax treaties in
place, (2) open lines of communication for further development of more
substantive tax treaties, and (3) improve goodwill and build a lasting
economic relationship with South American economies. All of this will
greatly improve the likelihood of achieving free trade in the Americas.

